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Abstract
I study the effect of a formative experience on political beliefs in a distant country.
This paper looks at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster of April 1986 and voters’ response
in West Germany. The analysis uses a diff-in-diff estimation which exploits variation
in proximity to the nearest nuclear power plant (NPP) across 301 counties. Proximity
is used as proxy for the shock from perceived risk of a nuclear accident. Using
data over almost 40 years and 11 elections, my results indicate that living closer to
an NPP benefited the explicitly anti- and pro-nuclear parties, the Greens and the
Conservatives. The findings are persistent and robust to the inclusion of several socio-
economic controls as well as checks for the validity of the identifying assumptions.
The gains of the Greens are similar across social groups and in line with home-voter
effects. The effect of proximity on the conservatives increases with education and the
number of adolescents in their impressionable years. I argue that this can be explained
by political belief formation and differences in assessing the economic benefits from
nuclear power over the actual risk of an accident. Using variation in the scheduling of
subsequent state elections, I can also show that the pro-nuclear response was stronger
in counties which did not vote in the immediate aftermath of Chernobyl and thus
had more time for a rational electoral choice.
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1 Introduction
The impact of experience on people’s belief formation has recently received wide
attention in the economics literature. The exposure to unusual, highly traumatic or
joyful events in one’s life has been shown to leave large footprints in people’s minds
and set the path for various future outcomes such as trust, political attitudes, or
marriage decisions. The research until now has also been very diverse in terms
of the analysed event and geography. Madestam and Yanagizawa-Drott (2012), for
instance, look at how patriotic events affect political preferences in the United States
and Chen and Yang (2015) investigate the impact of the Great Famine on political
trust in China. Malmendier and Nagel (2011) and Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014)
both look at how recessions can shape young individuals’ attitudes towards risk and
redistribution. Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), on the other hand, study the effect
of a long-term event like the slave trade on mistrust in contemporary Africa. What
most studies have in common is the focus on first-hand experiences or events in
people’s immediate surroundings. Evidence on the impact of remote phenomena
with an entirely psychological effect, however, has remained scarce until now.
This paper studies a distant event, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster of April 1986,
and its political effects on Western Germany.1 At the time of the accident, 18
nuclear power plants (henceforth NPP) were operating in Germany and 14 more
were at a planning or construction stage. The use of nuclear energy was not a
salient political issue until the disaster and only the recently founded Green party
was openly opposing nuclear energy (Joppke, 1990). Protest against new NPPs was
either highly localised or coming from radical leftist groups. My empirical analysis
exploits the county variation in distance to the nearest nuclear facility to study the
impact of the disaster on voting behaviour in the short and long-run. Proximity to
the nearest facility is interpreted as the intensity at which the informational shock
about the dangers of nuclear energy was perceived and has been analysed in similar
applications (Abadie and Dermisi, 2008; Pignataro and Prarolo, 2012; Bauer, Braun,
and Kvasnicka, 2014). I add to this literature by applying the proximity measure to
the first and most important nuclear disaster in Europe.
The dataset features a list of all nuclear facilities in West Germany and the near
abroad as well as results of 11 Federal elections in 301 counties in West Germany
over the time period 1976 to 2013. Results are provided for the four main German
parties including the emerging Green party. My empirical analysis exploits this data
1 For the sake of simplicity, I refer in the remainder to the Federal Republic of Germany and
post-unification Germany simply as Germany and to the German Democratic Republic as East
Germany.
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structure for a differences-in-differences estimation to study the change in proxim-
ity’s impact on voting behaviour after April 1986. Concerns about the endogeneity
of power plants’ locations are met by controlling for a range of socio-economic fac-
tors such as age structure, economic well-being and education. My baseline results
show that counties closer to the nearest NPP experience see a significant increase in
votes for the leftist Green party as well as the centre-right conservative CDU/CSU
at the expense of ideologically less extreme parties. Moving from the bottom to the
top decile in proximity, results in a 0.25% higher vote share for Greens and a 1.34%
increase for the CDU/CSU. My findings are robust to various robustness checks
and are not driven by elections in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. Rather,
polarisation continues through to the latest German Bundestag election in 2013.
In order to get at the mechanisms driving my results, I investigate three different
channels. First, I look at other political outcomes to establish that proximity did not
lead to a punishment of the parties who approved the respective power plant but on
the other hand significantly increased turnout and polarisation of election results.
Second, building on the importance of formative years and the persistence of political
preferences, I also investigate variation in time to the next election and counties’ age
structure. I find that that late post-Chernobyl elections and higher share of 15-25
year old individuals at the time of the accident are positively increasing the proximity
effect of the conservatives but not the Green party. A special role of this age group is
in line with research on the importance of impressionable years for the formation of
political beliefs (Krosnick and Alwin, 1989). Finally, I demonstrate that the effect is
not depending on differences in economic well-being and that educational differences
in areas of higher NPP-proximity are only benefiting the conservatives.
Taken together, the results suggest that living closer to a nuclear power plant
during the Chernobyl accident had two separate effects on political attitudes in
Germany. The first one is higher support for the anti-nuclear Green party which
appears to be stemming from areas with lower numbers of adolescents and otherwise
is independent of socio-economic characteristics. This finding is in line with the
general aversion of citizens towards high-risk facilities in their surroundings, also
known as NIMBY (Not In My BackYard) effects. The second effect is a rise in
votes for the pro-nuclear CDU/CSU in areas closer to an NPP among the young
and educated. Despite appearing counter-intuitive at first, this resembles similar
findings on the 1976 California primary elections in which an anti-nuclear initiative
was opposed particularly by the more educated part of society (Kuklinski, Metlay,
and Kay, 1982). These authors find that voters with higher knowledge were relying
stronger on a cost-benefit analysis in their decision process rather than ideology or
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peers. This provides a link between the level of education and voting conservative
after Chernobyl. In my context, such local benefits could be job opportunities and
positive externalities such as investments in infrastructure. I argue that especially
young and educated individuals may oppose the shut-down of nuclear facilities since
they are more likely to adapt and have a more accurate assessment of the actual
risk of a nuclear disaster (Shaw, 1996).
This paper links to several research areas. Most closely related are the studies
of life-changing experiences and the formation and persistence of beliefs mentioned
above. Furthermore, there exists a good amount of research on the health effects
of the Chernobyl disaster (e.g. Lu¨ning et al., 1989; Almond, Edlund, and Palme,
2009; Danzer and Danzer, 2014). I add to this work by investigating the political
effects of Chernobyl in West Germany. Also the effect of NPP-proximity has been
investigated in few recent studies. Pignataro and Prarolo (2012) look at how living
closer to a planned power plant affected voting in the 2011 Nuclear referendum in
Italy and find a positive effect on anti-nuclear voting decisions. Schumacher (2014),
on the other hand, looks at how distance to an NPP correlates with votes for the
German Green party between 1998 and 2009. Distance to an NPP can, however,
also affect economic outcomes as Bauer, Braun, and Kvasnicka (2014) show in their
study on the changes in housing prices after the Fukushima accident in 2013. My
paper extends this literature in several ways. First, I relate proximity to an NPP also
to votes of parties other than the Greens. Second, I study the effect of proximity to
NPP at a point when the dangers of nuclear energy were most likely to be perceived
as an informational shock.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, I will give a brief
discussion of the conceptual framework and the predicted effects of the Chernobyl
disaster in Germany according to the current state of research. This is followed by
a description of the political and historical background of nuclear power usage in
Germany in order to provide the reader with the necessary context of this case study.
The next two sections discuss the data and the identification strategy. My empirical
analysis starts by presenting the baseline results and several robustness checks and
then moves on to exploring the mechanisms driving my findings on voting behaviour
in West Germany. The final section concludes.
2 Conceptual framework
The political effects of the Chernobyl disaster can be divided into two categories.
The first one concerns the persistence of the disaster’s political impact. As exem-
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plified in the study by Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014), one would expect that
Chernobyl as a formative event per se has long-lasting effects particularly on young
people between the age of 18 and 25. Focus on this age group is motivated by
psychological research which has shown that impressionable years are crucial for
shaping beliefs and attitudes of an individual (Krosnick and Alwin, 1989). A long-
term change in political behaviour could, however, also be rationalised through the
general persistence in people’s voting decisions. Spontaneous, one-time protest votes
in response to the Chernobyl disaster could thus turn into long-term changes in elec-
toral support. An empirical example of this mechanism are Kaplan and Mukand
(2014) who show that party registrations in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks
strongly predict future party support.
The other category addresses differences in voters’ electoral response to Cher-
nobyl. Living closer to an NPP is a typical case in which one would expect NIMBY
and home-voter effects. In essence, both theories predict that voters will opt for
policy choices increasing the value of their home and against those which diminish
it or are expected to be harmful.2 Following these mechanisms would predict an
increase in votes for anti-nuclear parties as a response to the Chernobyl disaster
depending on how close voters live to the nearest NPP. This view is supported also
for the issue of nuclear power plants in the study by Pignataro and Prarolo (2012)
on the 2011 Nuclear Referendum in Italy and Schumacher (2014) in his work on the
determinants of Green votes between 1998 and 2009.
The rejection of nuclear power among voters is, however, ambiguous. Kuklinski,
Metlay, and Kay (1982), for instance, investigated the 1976 California primary elec-
tions in which the majority of people voted against a phase-out from nuclear power.
Even though this event took place before the disastrous Three Mile Island acci-
dent in March 1979, which boosted the anti-nuclear movement in the United States,
the study offers important insights. The authors find, for example, that educated
people were more likely to object the 1976 proposal and that this may be based
on their different abilities to assess the costs and benefits from abandoning nuclear
power. Following this view, voters of higher education may react differently to an
increased awareness from NPP-proximity and decrease or even offset the NIMBY
effects described above.
Having described the conceptual framework of the analysis, I will now move on
to give a detailed historical description of nuclear power usage in West Germany,
the anti-nuclear movement and the aftermath of the Chernobyl.
2 See (Pignataro and Prarolo, 2012) for a detailed discussion of the two mechanisms and an
application to the issue of NPPs.
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3 Historical background
3.1 Nuclear energy in West Germany, the new social move-
ments, and the early years of the West German Greens
Germany’s experience with nuclear energy goes back as far as WWII to the Uranium
Project of the Nazi regime and the construction of several research reactors. After
being banned from nuclear research until 1955, the first research reactor in Garching
near Munich went into operation in October 1957 (Hassel, Koester, and Pabst, 1997).
The civilian usage of nuclear power in West Germany started in November 1960 with
the NPP in Kahl near Frankfurt am Main which was followed by five further plants
during the 1960s. Table 1 provides an overview of all NPPs and their operation and
approval. Initially, the arrival of this novel energy source was not politicised in any
way and hailed by all three major German parties CDU/CSU, FDP, and SPD. This
elite consensus was sustained by population and the media alike who showed little
to no interest in the new technology until about the mid 1970s. Another sign of the
low priority of nuclear power issues was the delegation of responsibilities regarding
commissions and NPP sites to state ministries (Joppke, 1993).
The oil crises of the 1970s fundamentally changed the situation for several rea-
sons: first, it encouraged a massive expansion of nuclear energy as it made Western
Germany less dependent on oil-producing countries and secondly, it brought the
limits of economic growth to the attention of the wider public and raised awareness
about the environmental impact of growth (Joppke, 1990). Citizens’ initiatives in-
spired by the student movement of the 1960s became the first anti-nuclear groups
of West Germany and started to organise local protests against existing or planned
NPPs. Anti-nuclear initiatives themselves differed substantially in respect to their
usage of violent means as well as their social origins. While some were peaceful and
organised with the broad support of the local population, others were dominated by
radical communist and autonomous groupings from larger cities. For these, the op-
position to nuclear energy was just one way of fighting the capitalist state in which
the use of violence was legitimate and even encouraged (Joppke, 1993). Overall, the
protest movement was thus confined to the urban radical left and the population
living in the immediate surroundings of nuclear power plants.
The roots of the German Green party lie within the new social movements (NSPs)
of the 1960s and 1970s from which also the anti-nuclear movements originated and
who distinguished themselves from established parties primarily through their focus
on post-material values. Focal issues included environmental awareness and opposi-
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Table 1: Nuclear power plants in West Germany
Nuclear power plant State Start of operation Approving state government
Kahl Bavaria 01/02/1962 CSU, GB/BHE
MZFR Karlsruhe Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 19/12/1966 CDU, FDP
GundremmingenA Bavaria 12/04/1967 CSU
Lingen Lower Saxony 01/10/1968 SPD, FDP
Obrigheim Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 01/04/1969 CDU, FDP
Juelich Northrhine-Westphalia 19/05/1969 CDU
Grosswelzheim Bavaria 02/08/1970 CSU
Stade Lower Saxony 19/05/1972 SPD, CDU
Niederaichbach Bavaria 01/01/1973 CSU
KNK KarlsruheI Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 21/02/1974 CDU
BiblisA Hesse 26/02/1975 SPD
Wuergassen Northrhine-Westphalia 11/11/1975 SPD
Neckarwestheim1 Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 01/12/1976 CDU, SPD
BiblisB Hesse 31/01/1977 SPD
Brunsbuettel Schleswig-Holstein 09/02/1977 CDU, FDP
KNK KarlsruheII Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 03/03/1979 CDU
Isar/Ohu1 Bavaria 21/03/1979 CSU
Unterweser Lower Saxony 06/09/1979 SPD
Philippsburg1 Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 26/03/1980 CDU, SPD
Grafenrheinfeld Bavaria 17/06/1982 CSU
Kruemmel Schleswig-Holstein 28/03/1984 CDU
GundremmingenB Bavaria 19/07/1984 CSU
GundremmingenC Bavaria 18/01/1985 CSU
Grohnde Lower Saxony 01/02/1985 SPD
Philippsburg2 Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 18/04/1985 CDU
Brokdorf Schleswig-Holstein 22/12/1986 CDU
Hamm-Uentrop Northrhine-Westphalia 01/06/1987 CDU, FDP
Muelheim-Kaerlich Rhineland-Palatinate 01/10/1987 CDU
Isar/Ohu2 Bavaria 09/04/1988 CSU
Emsland Lower Saxony 20/06/1988 CDU
Neckarwestheim2 Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 15/04/1989 CDU
tion to nuclear energy but also emancipation of women, gay rights, peace and civil
rights. Yet, it was especially ecological initiatives which started from 1977 to form
electoral alliances and to participate in local elections (Probst, 2013). After initial
successes in municipal and state elections in northern Germany, the initially loose
alliances in several states started to cooperate and formally registered as parties.
Simultaneously, ecological alternatives also participated in the elections to the Eu-
ropean Parliament 1979 as SPV Die Gru¨nen which attained 3.2% in Germany.3 This
entitled SPV Die Gru¨nen to 4.5 million Deutsche Mark of campaign funding and
provided a crucial stepping stone for transforming the alliance into the new party
Die Gru¨nen in January 1980 (Falter and Klein, 2003). In the 1983 election, Die
Gru¨nen received 5.6% of the total votes and for the first time entered the German
3 SPV is short for Sonstige Politische Vereinigung(Other Political Association The Greens).
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parliament (Bundestag) and was now also represented in 6 out of 11 West German
State parliaments.
3.2 Chernobyl and its effect on public opinion
On the 26th of April 1986, an accident in the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (Soviet
Union, now Ukraine) led to a reactor explosion and the release of enormous amounts
of radioactive material. The consequences for the local population and nature were
devastating: areas within a 30km radius of the plant (about 330.000 inhabitants)
were evacuated and are still not inhabitable today due to radiation. Research by the
Chernobyl Forum estimated about 9,000 cancer deaths in highly contaminated areas
directly related to the disaster (Ebermann and Junkert, 2011). Due to wind and
rain patterns in the immediate aftermath of the accident, also wider parts of Eu-
rope were exposed to radioactive fallout. In Germany, contamination was strongly
concentrated in the very South-East but so far could not be linked to direct health
effects on the local population in scientific studies (Cort, 1998). The German Ra-
diation Protection Commission (Strahlenschutzkommission) released recommended
maximum radiation values for raw milk and leafy vegetables in May 1986 which led
to the destruction of harvests particularly in Southern Germany (Ebermann and
Junkert, 2011).
The German public had already been aware to some extent about nuclear en-
ergy’s dangers before the accident. Since most of this awareness was coming from
anti-nuclear initiatives rather than the state, there was a deep distrust towards
official information and advice regarding the Chernobyl disaster’s consequences.
Attention-seeking media titles such as “Mass death after Chernobyl” or “Chernobyl
is killing Munich’s children” and the uncoordinated reactions by the official author-
ities turned Germans’ scepticism about nuclear power into outright fear and even
panic (Ebermann and Junkert, 2011). While the federal government was not tak-
ing any actions and played down the dangers of the disaster, some states started
to introduce measures such as tolerance levels of radiation and bans on the certain
vegetables which further deepened the pre-existing mistrust (Joppke, 1990).
A long-term result of the Chernobyl disaster was the drop in public support for
nuclear energy and new power plants (Boer and Catsburg, 1988). At the political
level, only the social democrats responded by starting to oppose the usage of nu-
clear energy while conservatives and liberals remained neutral and soon afterwards
returned to a pro-nuclear stance. At the local level, the disaster led on the one hand
to a radicalisation of the existing anti-nuclear power movement and on the other
hand to the emergence of a more civilised middle-class protest movement. This new
8
movement consisted mainly of concerned citizens preferring information campaigns
and lobbying of politicians to violent rallies. The wider appeal of this grass-roots
type of protest as opposed to its radical counterpart is exemplified by a petition
against a nuclear power plant in Bavaria which gained almost 900,000 signatures
(Joppke, 1990).
3.3 The Green party’s ascend to power and Germany’s exit
from nuclear energy
During the 1987 elections – 10 months after the Chernobyl disaster and despite
severe tensions between the orthodox and moderate party factions – the Greens could
increase their vote share to 8.3%. A major success was the formation of a coalition
with the social democrats in Hesse and the first entry into a state government. The
German reunification in 1989 and the subsequent Bundestag election in December
1990 were an ambivalent experience for the party: on the one hand they started
cooperating with the East German civil rights party Bu¨ndnis 90, on the other hand
it was only for this cooperation and a one-time exception in the electoral law that
the Greens remained in parliament. While the West German branch of Die Gru¨nen
only received 4.8%, its East German counterpart attained 6.1% and thus managed
to cross the 5% hurdle at least in one part of the reunified country. The Greens’
focus on environmental topics and the deliberate neglect of current issues such as
the unification severely backfired in this case (Probst, 2013). The 1990 alliance was
formally turned into an association in January 1993 and the party changed its name
officially to Bu¨ndnis 90/Die Gru¨nen. Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the German
Green party using their vote shares in German Federal elections.
Throughout the 1990s the German Greens continued their trend towards more
moderate policy positions and managed to increase their vote share to 7.3% in the
1994 Federal parliamentary election and enter state governments in Northrhine-
Westphalia, Schleswig-Holstein, and Hamburg. Importantly, the decline of the more
extreme wing within the party did not mean a more compromising position on the
usage of nuclear power or environmental issues in general. This proved detrimental
when in 1998 they adopted an electoral platform arguing for raising the price of
petrol to 5 Deutsche Mark per liter over time. Political enemies of the Greens ex-
ploited this topic extensively which almost led to a repetition of the 1990 experience
and the Greens received only 6.7% remaining well below their expectations. The
strong gains of the social democrats, however, still made it possible to form the
first federal government of SPD and Bu¨ndnis/Die Gru¨nen. Apart from the foreign
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Figure 1: Voting for the German Greens over time
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ministry, which was now headed by party leader Joschka Fischer, the Greens also
took over the ministries of health and environment (Falter and Klein, 2003). In June
2000 the new government reached a first agreement with energy suppliers about a
complete exit from nuclear power within about 30 years depending on the spread
of a negotiated maximum production cap over the existing NPPs. This agreement
was turned into law in April 2002, only few months before the next parliamentary
election. As a result, two power plants ceased operation in 2003 and 2005 (Ru¨dig,
2000; Jahn and Korolczuk, 2012).
After the 2005 election which led to a Grand Coalition between CDU/CSU and
SPD without the Greens, the new nuclear law was left untouched despite the con-
servatives’ strong favour for nuclear energy. This changed in 2009 when a coalition
of conservatives and liberals took power and all parties responsible for the nuclear
phase-out had left the government. Already in December 2010, law was changed
anew to substantially extended operation times of existing NPPs. The Fukushima
accident in March 2011 turned this policy into a boomerang for the new government.
Facing three important state elections and an upset electorate, the CDU/CSU/FDP
government hastily abandoned its pro-nuclear policy and decided on the immedi-
ate shutdown of the 8 oldest power plants and a complete exit from nuclear energy
by 2022. Nevertheless, the CDU lost power after 58 years in the state of Baden-
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Wu¨rttemberg which has since been led by a first Green Minister-President of Ger-
many (Gabriel and Keil, 2012; Jahn and Korolczuk, 2012).
4 Data
4.1 Distance to Nuclear facilities
In order to construct my treatment variable, I collected data on nuclear facilities in
Germany and the near abroad from several sources. Lists of reactors were taken from
Bredberg et al. (2015) for Germany and from nucleopedia.org for all other European
countries. Both sources also feature key dates of each facility such as start and end
of operation, beginning of construction, and approval. Furthermore, the data allows
me to differentiate between power plants and research reactors. From the website
election.de I also obtained the names of the parties forming the state government
at the time of approval and thus responsible for a specific facility in West Germany.
Finally, I geocoded the location of all reactors using the website OpenStreetMap.org
which is displayed in figure 2. This information is paired with a map of West German
counties from the Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy (2014) and raster
data on population density from CIESIN (2005).
Combining this information allows me to calculate the distance of each county’s
population centroid from each nuclear facility. In the baseline version of my treat-
ment variable, I assign to each district the distance from the nearest nuclear power
plant (NPP) in Western Europe only. This is because knowledge about sites in East-
ern Europe might have been less accurate given the tight travelling restrictions to
Communist countries in the 1980s. The literature also does not report any protests in
West Germany against NPPs in Communist countries which could be related to the
general leftist orientation of West Germany’s anti-nuclear movement. In the analy-
sis I also differentiate between active NPPs and those in the planning/construction
stage in April 1986 and later on. In order to obtain proximity rather than distance
to the respective facility, values are multiplied by −1. Figure 3 and 4 plot the ge-
ographic dispersion and density of proximity to the nearest operating or planned
NPP at the time of the Chernobyl accident. The treatment has a mean about -50
and the median of -60 which reflects the distribution’s skewness to the left.
4.2 Federal and state election data 1980–2013
Election results are the main outcome used in the empirical analysis in section 6.
The first type are the Federal parliamentary (Bundestag) elections taking place
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Figure 2: Locations of facilities: Operating and planned NPPs
every four years or after a dissolution of parliament. The electoral system is a mixed
member proportional representation in which each citizen has two votes: one is for
the nominated party candidates in his precinct, the second one is for a specific
party and its list of candidates. The so-called first vote (Erststimme) follows a
pure majority rule and determines which candidates win a seat in the Bundestag
irrespective of their position in the party list. Votes for minority parties thus face a
high risk of not being counted at all and are often given to a candidate of a different
party with higher chances of winning. Since such incentives lead to heavy distortions
of voters’ actual political preferences, I focus on the second vote (Zweitstimme) which
determines what fraction of total seats are going to be held by the respective party
in general. Seats are allocated by the party lists in each state.
For each Federal election between 1980 and 2013 I obtained results at the county
level from the Federal Statistical Office (FSO) and the State Statistical Offices
(SSOs). Most of the recent data was made available on the FSO’s website Re-
gionalstatistik.de or the corresponding State equivalents. Older results had to be
collected directly from the State offices. The parties I’m focussing on are Greens
(B90/Die Gru¨nen), Social-Democrats (SPD), Liberals (FDP), and Conservatives
(CDU/CSU) whose shares are calculated as ballots cast for the respective party in
each county and election divided by total ballots cast. Figure 5 shows the evolution
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Figure 3: NPP-Proximityi on April, 26
th 1986 across Germany counties (state borders
in blue, non-sample states grey)
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Figure 5: Evolution of election results in Germany (before 1990 only FRG)
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of aggregate election results of West and post-unification Germany over the studied
period. Results are displayed for the four main parties as well as the socialists who
entered the German party system after the unification.
4.3 Control variables and construction of panel dataset
Using the same sources as the voting data, I also acquired extensive information
on each county’s socio-economic characteristics over the time period studied. The
first is the log of the total population in each county which accounts for the notable
differences in urbanisation. Two important determinant of Green votes which could
also be confounders are age and gender which I account for by including the share
of women and the share of 6 specific age groups in the overall population.4 Other
potential confounders are economic well-being and educational attainment: I mea-
sure well-being as the percentage of the total population receiving state benefits.
Unlike average income, this variable has the advantage of being resistant to outliers
on the top of the distribution and gives a precise estimate of the poor part of the
local population. Education is an important factor given the Green party’s focus on
post-material values and is reflected in particularly good results in university towns
4 The included groups are 15–20, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65. The share of 0–15 year olds
is omitted as the baseline category.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Vote share Greens 3, 685 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.29
Vote share Conservatives 3, 685 0.45 0.11 0.19 0.77
Vote share Social Democrats 3, 685 0.35 0.11 0.10 0.64
Vote share Liberals 3, 685 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.23
% Turnout 3, 685 0.81 0.07 0.58 0.95
Prox. closest NPP (planned) 3, 685 -0.71 0.39 -1.91 -0.05
Prox. closest NPP (operating) 3, 685 -0.61 0.30 -1.44 -0.06
Prox. closest NPP (op. & plan.) 3, 685 -0.51 0.26 -1.44 -0.05
Prox. closest reactor (op. & plan.) 3, 685 -0.43 0.26 -1.44 -0.01
Population in 1,000 3, 685 182.80 145.89 33.21 1, 330.44
% female 3, 685 0.52 0.01 0.49 0.57
% benefit recipients (−2005) 2, 680 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.12
% benefit recipients (2005−) 1, 005 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.09
% share of pupils in prep school 3, 685 0.18 0.10 0.00 0.88
Notes: The unit of observation is one of the 301 counties in the sample at election t. Non-voting
data available over several periods is linearly interpolated to the time of the election. Variables
provided at the cross-sectional level only are reported accordingly and used in the analysis by
interacting them with either a post-Chernobyl dummy or election fixed effects.
and among people of higher education in general. My final two control variables are
therefore distance to the closest university and the share of 0–15 years olds attending
grammar schools (Gymnasium).5 All control variables are interacted with election
dummies to allow for changing importance in people’s voting decisions over time.6
The states for which all of the information mentioned above could be retrieved
were Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia,
and Rhineland-Palatinate.7 Together, these six regions account for about 90% of
West Germany’s area and population. As mentioned before, the unit of observation
is county i at election t. Since there were almost no boundary changes during the
studied period, I can track 301 counties over the whole period from 1980 to 2013.
The values of the control variables are linearly interpolated to the election date since
they are usually measured at a statistical reference date.8 Table 2 shows summary
statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis.
5 A list of German-speaking universities in West Germany and Austria along with their geographic
coordinates was kindly provided to me by Fabian Waldinger.
6 Another important reason is the radical change in Germany’s benefit laws in 2005, the so-called
Hartz laws. This reduced the amount of benefit recipients dramatically without significant
changes in poverty.
7 I am currently in the process of digitising information for the city states Berlin, Bremen and
Hamburg and the two smallest states of Schleswig-Holstein and Saarland.
8 This is usually the 31st of December, apart from school enrolment data which takes mid-October
(15th) as reference date.
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5 Identification strategy
5.1 Differences-in-Differences specification
The panel structure of the data allows the simultaneous use of county and election
fixed-effects. In doing so, one can account for all election- and county- specific
characteristics. This is particularly helpful because the Chernobyl accident led to
a general rise in Green votes as shown in figure 5 which is mechanically correlated
with the changing effect of NPP-proximity after April 1986 and could thus result
in a strong upwards bias. But also fixed local characteristics crucial to the location
decision of an NPP such as proximity to navigable rivers and railroads could turn
out to be problematic. Since better infrastructure could be correlated with higher
income and education, this would open up an alternative link between nearby NPPs
and good electoral performance of the Greens. After including both types of fixed
effects, the remaining variation is only within counties and off any country-wide
election-specific trend.
The main variable of interest is the interaction of NPP-proximity
i
with a dummy
variable for any election after the Chernobyl disaster which measures the average
change in NPPs effect on electoral outcomes after the disaster as opposed to before.
The set and state of nuclear facilities is restricted to that of April, 26th 1986. This
has the disadvantage of not being responsive to changes in status and location of
plants but on the other hand is less prone to issues stemming from the endogeneity
of NPP shutdown decisions. Such a scenario could arise, for instance, if voters
were punishing the Greens for a shutdown in their vicinity which would open up
an additional channel between proximity and voting outcomes.9 Adding a set of
control variables completes the baseline regression specification:
yit = α + γi + λt + βt(NPP-Proximityi × postChernobylt) + µX it + ǫit (1)
5.2 Threats to identification
The identifying assumptions of the differences-in-differences estimation are twofold:
the first is the absence of confounding events which would require any correlate
of NPP location to change its effect on voting around the time of the Chernobyl
disaster. Riester (2010), provides a short list of criteria used in Germany for choosing
the sites of nuclear facilities:
9 An alternative would be omitting shutdowns and confining attention only to NPPs starting to
operate over time. I investigate this alternative specification as a robustness check in section 6.2.
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1. Earthquake/flood-proof, suitable building ground
2. Not located in an urban agglomeration
3. Well connected to public road, train, and waterway network
4. Site should be already designated industrial estate
5. Vicinity to river with sufficient flow
6. Located in a region of high and preferably increasing energy consumption and
with link to high-voltage grid
Criteria 2 and 6 together insinuate a quadratic relationship between proximity
and urbanisation/population size. Since inhabitants of cities could systematically
change their political preferences after April 1986, log(population) and log(population)2
seem to be crucial confounders and are therefore included in the regressions. Other
factors such as connection to transportation, rivers, and soil quality are highly un-
likely to change their effect on voting behaviour after Chernobyl and are thus already
accounted for through the use of county fixed effects. Another endogeneity issue
could be systematic selection into treatment. For example, environmental activists
could move closer to NPPs after Chernobyl in order to facilitate protests and raise
awareness of the local population. Alternatively, the Green party could also target
campaigning towards affected areas. The first concern is addressed by the inclusion
of age and education which captures changes in the electorate’s composition towards
those parts of the population most likely to support the Greens. The second one
is met by checking for endogeneity of turnout with respect to NPP-proximity after
Chernobyl which should be another consequence of increased campaign intensity.
The second main assumption is that election outcomes in counties of different
proximity would follow identical patterns absent treatment and conditional on con-
trol variables. This condition breaks down if areas of different treatment intensities
were already starting to diverge before the actual treatment due to anticipation
or unobserved correlates. One could, for example, imagine that areas closer to an
NPP were already better informed about the dangers of nuclear energy and would
have increased their Green votes share even in the absence of Chernobyl. In a re-
gression this would mechanically load the widening gap onto the interaction term
NPP-Proximity
i
×postChernobyl
t
and lead to a large overstatement of the treatment
effect. As a first attempt to investigate this issue, I plot the average vote share for
the Green party over time in areas above and below the median of proximity to
the nearest NPP in figure 6. Reassuringly, both groups have fairly similar support
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Figure 6: Average Green vote share before/after Chernobyl depending on NPP-
Proximity (median)
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Figure 7: Average Green vote share before/after Chernobyl depending on NPP-
Proximity (quartile)
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levels before April 1986 and start to diverge in the 1987 election where counties
closer to an NPP have about 1% higher Green vote shares. After a quick drop in
1990, the gaps continue to widen with a peak in 2002 until they are almost back to
their pre-treatment gap in 2009.
However, looking at the more extreme case of counties in the lowest and highest
quartile of the NPP-proximity in figure 7, divergence across groups may have already
taken place between 1980 and 1983. This prompts for a more thorough investigation
of the common trends assumptions which I carry out in several ways: first, I allow
for non-linear trends at higher levels of aggregation by including state and district-
specific time fixed-effects. In addition to that, I also include unit-specific trends
which allow each county to exhibit an arbitrary linear pattern over the whole time
period. Both procedures should leave the coefficient of interest unaffected in the
absence of the corresponding pre-trend. Finally, I also interact the treatment with
election fixed effects instead of a post-Chernobyl dummy. This makes it possible
to investigate the changes in the effect of NPP-proximity with respect to a baseline
election and to capture any non-linear relationship with the outcome of interest
before the Chernobyl disaster. Bearing those caveats in mind, I will now proceed to
the baseline results.
6 The effect of nuclear facilities on elections in
West Germany
6.1 Baseline results
Table 3 shows the effect of NPP-Proximity on Green party votes after subsequently
accounting for two-way fixed effects and control variables. Initially, there seems to
be a strong negative correlation between proximity to the nearest NPP and Green
votes which is even increasing in magnitude after the inclusion of fixed effects in
specification 2. The only takeaway from this is that the omitted time-invariant local
characteristics are correlated in the same way with the outcome and the treatment
variable NPP-Proximity
i
× postChernobyl
t
. Once I also include election fixed effects
in the next column, the negative correlation observed before remains significant but
turns positive. Since the correlation between NPP-Proximity
i
× postChernobyl
t
and
t is negative by construction and the Green party share is increasing over time,
this does not come as a surprise. The final specification in column 4 controls for
an extensive set of county characteristics. While this decreases the coefficient of
interest further to 0.004 it remains significant at 10%. According to the baseline
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Table 3: Baseline estimates
Green party vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NPP-Proximity −0.043∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.004∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
County FE N Y Y Y
Election FE N N Y Y
Controls N N N Y
Counties 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.135 0.574 0.902 0.970
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01; Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which
is omitted from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2;
% Female; % Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients
of social benefits; % Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; %
Turnout 1983 (all interacted with election FE)
estimate, counties located 100km closer to an operating or planned NPP have on
average a 0.4% higher support for the Green party in Bundestag elections after the
Chernobyl disaster, ceteris paribus.
Since the gains of the Greens from NPP-Proximity have to be at the expense of
other parties, I investigate in table 4 the treatment effect on the rest of Germany’s
party system. Interestingly, it turns out that proximity to an NPP after April 1986
did not lead to a general swing to the left but instead lowered votes for the So-
cial Democrat and the Liberal parties and benefited the Conservative CDU/CSU
even more than the Greens. Also minority parties saw their combined vote share
marginally decline. The large responses of the conservative and social-democratic
parties are, however, mainly due to their overall higher amount of votes: standard-
izing the coefficients reveals that a one standard increase in NPP-Proximity yields
an increase of 0.034 standard deviations in Green vote share as opposed to 0.058
for the conservatives.10 This means that although the nominal effect on the main
parties is notably higher, the impact of NPP-Proximity on Green and Liberal vote
shares given their scale is not very different. In sum, the baseline results suggest a
polarisation of voting patterns in response to the Chernobyl accident depending on
being located closer or farther away from an NPP where both the most left-wing
and the most right-wing of the main parties gained. The next section evaluates the
validity of the identifying assumptions and the sensitivity of the baseline results.
10 The standardized coefficients are reported in table 13 in the appendix.
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Figure 8: Time-varying treatment effect estimates and 90% CI: Green party vote
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6.2 Robustness checks
The first tests will address the doubts about the validity of the common trends
assumption raised by figure 7. To start with, I include area-specific election fixed
effects into the baseline regression. Doing so purges the entire effect of state/district
specific variables from the estimation. If the observed effect of NPP-Proximity was
driven by pre-treatment divergence from state or district unobservables, this should
leave the coefficient of interest insignificant. In the next step, I add county-specific
time trends to take into account arbitrary long-term linear developments in voting
patterns which might be mistakenly identified as a treatment effect. Finally, I also
use combinations of these additional variables. Columns 2 and 3 in table 5 show
that the baseline estimate is particularly sensitive to the inclusion of state- and
district-specific election fixed effects. County-specific trends in specification 4, on
the other hand, strengthen the baseline estimate. Also when using both linear trends
and area-specific election dummies, the coefficient for NPP-Proximity drops in size
and is insignificantly different from zero. Taken together, these results caution that
non-linear pre-trends stemming from differences at the district or state level could
be driving the results.
Another way to assess the prevalence of diverging patterns before the Chernobyl
accident is allowing for a time-varying treatment effect. This can be implemented
21
Table 4: The effect of NPP-proximity on other parties
Vote share Greens Social-
Democrats
Liberals Conserva-
tives
Others
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NPP-Proximity 0.004∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.004 0.020∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.970 0.979 0.936 0.969 0.961
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01; Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which
is omitted from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2;
% Female; % Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients
of social benefits; % Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; %
Turnout 1983 (all interacted with election FE)
Table 5: Baseline results and different FE specifications
Green party vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NPP-Proximity 0.004∗ −0.000 0.000 0.005∗∗ 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election × State FE N Y N N Y N
Election × District FE N N Y N N Y
County FE × t N N N Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.970 0.977 0.983 0.985 0.989 0.992
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01; Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which
is omitted from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2;
% Female; % Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients
of social benefits; % Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; %
Turnout 1983 (all interacted with election FE)
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by interacting NPP-proximity with election fixed effects instead of a post-Chernobyl
dummy and normalising the effect to zero at the last election before the disaster.
Doing so provides a placebo test and makes it possible to check whether proximity
to a nuclear plant already had an effect on voting outcome prior to April 1986 and
whether this effect was already increasing over time beforehand. Figure 8 plots
the estimated time-varying effect of NPP-proximity on the vote share of the Green
party from 1976 up to 2013. Reassuringly, the results suggest that the effect of
living closer to an NPP in 1983 was not significantly different from that of the two
elections before. After 1983, the coefficient rises from around 0 to almost 0.005
where it remains until 2002 with the exception of the unification election in 1990.
The effect drops sharply for the 2005 and 2009 election and sees a slight rebound in
2013. Taken together, these patterns are compatible with the view that Chernobyl
led to a persistent increase in Green votes until a phase-out from nuclear energy
was officially decided in 2002. The result for 1990 does not fit the pattern but was
dominated by one of the most important events in Germany’s contemporaneous
history which the Green party deliberately ignored. Germany’s abandonment of the
exit strategy from nuclear energy and the Fukushima accident brought this topic
back to the public’s attention. This can also be seen from the rising coefficient in
2013 which is, however, not significant at the 10% level.
The final set of checks is concerned with the estimates’ robustness to alternative
definitions of NPP-proximity regarding the set of facilities used to calculate prox-
imities as well as the functional form used. The analysis starts with table 7 which
presents the regression results for 8 alternative treatment specifications. The spec-
ifications differ on three dimensions: 1) status (planned or operating), 2) purpose
(including research reactors or not) and 3) location (Germany, Western Europe, or
the entire Europe). Column 5 repeats the baseline results for easier comparison.
From the first three columns one can see that the most of the effect is driven by the
proximity to planned nuclear power plants rather than an operating ones. When
looking only at facilities in Germany as done in column 1, the two separate effects
actually go into the opposite direction. A speculative explanation of this finding
could be that within Germany, operating plants may be an important employer and
the Greens are thus seen as a threat to local employment after the Chernobyl disas-
ter.11 When pooling operating and planned facilities together, the two effects cancel
each other out in column 4 while in 5 and 6 this pooling only adds some noise and
the point estimate remains almost the same. The last three specifications look at the
11 An alternative story could be that people had a strong dislike for NPPs being replaced by
less-clean fossil fuel power plants like coal.
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impact of proximity to the nearest NPP or research reactor. Doing so diminishes
the size of the coefficients in columns 4 to 6 and leaves them insignificant. Overall,
the results in table 7 show that the baseline result is not completely dependent on
the set of NPPs chosen for the proximity measure. The restriction to one single
coefficient rather than two separate ones for planned and operating NPPs, however,
also comes at the cost of masking some heterogeneity in the effect. The precise
way in which NPP-proximity was affecting voting behaviour and which parts of the
population were most responsive is addressed in the following section.
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Table 6: Differences-in-Differences estimates with time-varying treatment effect
Vote share Greens Social-
Democrats
Liberals Conserva-
tives
Others
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NPP-Proximity × 1976 −0.001 −0.000 −0.004∗ −0.000 0.006
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005)
1980 −0.001 0.004 0.002 −0.007 0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002)
1987 0.004∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ 0.001 0.006 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
1990 0.001 −0.008∗∗ −0.003 0.014∗ −0.003
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004)
1994 0.004∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.002
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003)
1998 0.005∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004)
2002 0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.002 0.007∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.012) (0.002)
2005 0.002 −0.016∗ −0.007∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.000
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
2009 0.001 −0.024∗∗∗ −0.004 0.030∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005)
2013 0.004 −0.023∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.010) (0.005)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.971 0.979 0.936 0.969 0.961
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01; Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which
is omitted from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2;
% Female; % Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients
of social benefits; % Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; %
Turnout 1983 (all interacted with election FE)
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Table 7: Sensitivity to alternative treatment definitions
Green party vote share
Used facilities Nuclear power plants NPPs + research reactors
Sample Germany Western
Europe
Europe Germany Western
Europe
Europe Germany Western
Europe
Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NPP-Proximity 0.002 0.004∗ 0.004∗ 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
NPP-Proximity (operating) −0.004∗ 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
NPP-Proximity (planned) 0.004∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.971 0.971 0.971 0.970 0.970 0.970 0.970 0.970 0.970
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with
a postChernobyl dummy, which is omitted from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2; % Female; % Population
aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients of social benefits; % Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest
university; % Turnout 1983 (all interacted with election FE)
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7 Mechanisms
7.1 Changes in the political landscape
As the results in table 4 have already shown, it was not only the Green party
which gained after April 1986 in areas closer to an NPP but also the conservative
CDU/CSU. The parties losing were SPD and FDP who were positioned more at the
centre of the political spectrum. In general, there are many ways of how to explain
this notable change in the political landscape after Chernobyl. One of these would
be that voters systematically punish politicians responsible for the NPP in their
area. Since the location decision is carried out at the state level (Joppke, 1993),
this would imply punishing the parties in power at the time of approval. In order to
investigate the relevance of such punishment votes, I construct for each county the
party vote share of the government in power during the approval of the nearest NPP.
This, however, can only be done using the sample of NPPs inside West Germany,
assuming that voters cannot punish foreign governments. Another way in which the
disaster could have changed voting patterns is by raising political awareness and
participation in political life in favour of parties with more extreme positions. As
mentioned in chapter 5.2, this could be either because of NPP-proximity itself or as
a result of targeted campaigning in the surrounding areas of nuclear power plants.
Any proximity effect on turnout will thus not be able to differentiate between these
two mechanisms. A third additional explanation would be that the sudden politi-
cisation of nuclear power usage led to political polarisation in the local population.
Potential lines of conflict in this case could be economic dependency on the NPP as
an employer and the perceived danger or awareness of nuclear energy’s risks. Voting
patterns could have diverged since only the parties on the very left and right would
guarantee the implementation of a distinct pro- or anti-nuclear policy. In order to
measure political polarisation, I construct an index similar to Xezonakis (2012) for
each election in each county.12
The three mentioned channels are investigated in table 8. Since the punishment
effect can only be evaluated using nuclear facilities in West Germany, I also report
the results for the Greens and the CDU/CSU in columns 1 and 2. Column 3 shows
that the parties approving the respective plant did not receive less votes in areas
located closer to the NPP but, if anything, actually gained after the Chernobyl ac-
cident. Hence, there is no empirical support for a punishment mechanism. Turnout,
12 The formula used is: Polarisation =
√∑
j=1 V oteSharejk(Ideologyjk − Ideologyk)
2. The four
main parties are placed on a discrete left-right ideology scale between -2 and 2 (omitting 0) for
the sake of simplicity.
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Table 8: The effect of NPP-proximity on the political landscape
Vote share Greens Conserva-
tives
NPP Ap-
provers
Turnout Polari-
sation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NPP-Proximity (West. Germany) 0.002 0.022∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.002) (0.006) (0.009)
NPP-Proximity (West. Europe) 0.009∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.970 0.969 0.921 0.978 0.962
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01; Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which
is omitted from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2;
% Female; % Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients
of social benefits; % Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; %
Turnout 1983 (all interacted with election FE)
on the other hand, increases significantly as a response to NPP-proximity after April
1986. According to the estimate, living 100km closer to an NPP increases election
participation by almost 1% which is about 1/8 of a standard deviation of turnout.
Given the size of the coefficient, higher participation could explain the comparatively
small gains of the Green party but not the much larger ones of the conservatives.
Finally, in accordance with the single party results, also polarisation increases sig-
nificantly after Chernobyl in areas closer to a nuclear power plant. Areas located
100km closer to a nuclear power plant see polarisation increase by 0.023 which is
about one quarter of a standard deviation of the constructed index.
7.2 Chernobyl as a formative event
The results in table 6 not only provide a robustness test but also reveal that the
effect of NPP-proximity on voting behaviour persists even more than 20 years after
the Chernobyl accident. In the following, I investigate the reasons and mechanisms
underlying this persistence. I evaluate two channels which are both concerned with
the role of Chernobyl as a formative event in people’s life. The first of these is
considering the path-dependence of voting decisions taken shortly after the accident.
As recent empirical research has shown, voters are very hesitant in adjusting political
choices made in the past such as party registration (Kaplan and Mukand, 2014).
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Spontaneous electoral choices made under the emotional influence of a formative
event such as the Chernobyl disaster may therefore have long-lasting effects on
voting. In order to investigate this channel, I exploit the fact that two large German
states were holding state elections between April 1986 and the next Bundestag
election in January 1987: Lower Saxony (15th of July 1986) and Bavaria (12th of
October 1986). This allows me to check whether the effect of NPP-proximity lasted
longer depending on the amount of time voters had before going to the ballot boxes.
Table 9 shows that the proximity effect changes depending on months until
the next election. The impact on the large parties CDU/CSU and SPD seems to
be benefiting from voters’ having more time to think about their choice for the
next election. As table 9 shows, the negative effect on the social democrats is
mainly driven by counties who could vote shortly after Chernobyl while that of the
conservatives only gains significance in areas which did not vote immediately after
the disaster. This could be because coherence within the SPD was low during this
time and facilitated a spontaneous swing to left-wing fringe parties. Both regression
output and marginal effect plot in figure 9 also show that NPP-proximity did not
notably change its effect on Greens’ votes. The effect of proximity is decreasing
for Liberals and other parties in months until the next election. As table 9 shows,
fringe parties are actually significantly benefiting from NPP-proximity and close
elections. Path dependency originating from early elections after Chernobyl is thus,
if anything, mostly favouring fringe parties.13
The second channel looks into the role of age as a proxy for how formative the ef-
fect of NPP-proximity was for the average population of a county. This assumes that
the political beliefs of youths are easier to shape than those of elder people. Giuliano
and Spilimbergo (2014), for instance, have shown that experiencing economic reces-
sion during the impressionable years of 18 to 25 has considerable long-term effects
on people’s political views. In order to explore this mechanisms, I interact the treat-
ment variable with the share of 15 to 25 years olds at the time of the accident.14 The
regression results in table 10 immediately show that mostly conservatives and others
are affected by the interchange between NPP-proximity and the share of adolescents
around April 1986. The effect on the Green party, in contrast, is decreasing in the
affected counties’ share of 15 to 25 year olds and is only significant in the lower third
13 Liberals are not counted as fringe parties in this case. The marginal effect of NPP-proximity
on the FDP is close to zero and insignificant in counties with an early election and significantly
negative otherwise.
14 This procedure requires the inclusion of % aged 15-251983 × post-Chernobyl along with % aged
15-25t × election which could create a multicollinearity problem. I thus use pre-Chernobyl
controls as of 1983 interacted with election fixed-effects in all regressions looking at the effect of
pre-Chernobyl characteristics.
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Table 9: Memory effect of NPP-proximity
Greens Social-
Dem.
Liberals Conser-
vatives
Others Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NPP-Proximity 0.002 −0.028∗∗ 0.006 0.010 0.011 0.004
(0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008)
Months until next election 0.001∗∗ 0.001 0.000 −0.002∗ −0.000 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Prox. × Mon.s next elec. 0.000 0.002 −0.002∗ 0.002 −0.002∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.971 0.979 0.937 0.969 0.961 0.979
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01; Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which
is omitted from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2;
% Female; % Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients
of social benefits; % Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; %
Turnout 1983 (all interacted with election FE)
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Figure 9: Marginal effect of NPP-Proximity on voting conditional on months to
next election after Chernobyl
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of the distribution. Figure 10 shows that the treatment effect for the CDU/CSU is
strongest for the upper half of the adolescents’ distribution and insignificant or even
negative for the other one. The positive effect of NPP-proximity on conservative
votes is thus driven by areas with a young population during the Chernobyl accident
which insinuates that young people in those areas were mainly socialised towards
pro-nuclear parties rather than the Greens.
7.3 The socio-economic dimension of the Chernobyl effect
The final mechanism I am investigating addresses how different parts of society
were responding to the Chernobyl disaster and living closer or farther away from
a nuclear power plant. For this analysis, I look at effect heterogeneity along two
important socio-economic dimensions – economic well-being and education – which
I can measure before the treatment at the county level. Table 11 shows the results of
the baseline specification after interacting NPP-proximity with the population share
of benefit recipients before April 1986. Doing so only decreases the coefficient for
the conservatives but leaves the remaining parties unaffected. The marginal effect
plots in figure 11 for the parties benefiting from NPP-proximity illustrate that the
treatment effect on both Greens and CDU/CSU is strongest in the middle of the
distribution even though the marginal effects are never significant. Overall, differ-
ences in economic well-being seem to have little explanatory power for heterogeneity
in the proximity effect.
Given that these results could also reflect differences in educational attainment,
the analysis proceeds with exploring the heterogeneity coming from variation in the
level of education. Unlike age and economic well-being, education seems to be a
dimension which only increases the effect from NPP-proximity for the conservative
parties. Looking at the non-interacted coefficients on NPP-proximity in table 12,
the gains of the CDU/CSU from nuclear plants after Chernobyl turns negative for
(hypothetical) counties with no children attending preparatory school, while the
coefficient on the Green party barely changes. The fact that the baseline effect is
shifted far more towards the conservatives is, according to the estimates in table 12
mostly a result of county differences in educational attainment. The higher the
share of students in preparatory schools, the more the CDU/CSU is gaining from
NPP-proximity and the more social democrats and liberals are losing from proximity
to the nearest NPP. In the marginal effect plots in figure 12, one can see that the
marginal effect for the Greens is almost invariant to educational attainment unlike
the conservatives who see their effect strongly rise in counties of higher education.
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Table 10: Effect heterogeneity of NPP-proximity depending on age
Greens Social-
Dem.
Liberals Conser-
vatives
Others Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NPP-Proximity 0.028 0.062 0.035 −0.228∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ −0.017
(0.027) (0.050) (0.032) (0.063) (0.037) (0.035)
Prox. × % aged 15-25 pre-Cherno. −0.153 −0.487 −0.211 1.455∗∗∗−0.605∗∗ 0.137
(0.170) (0.314) (0.204) (0.406) (0.239) (0.214)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.968 0.979 0.936 0.975 0.956 0.974
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01; Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which
is omitted from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2;
% Female; % Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients
of social benefits; % Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; %
Turnout (all as of 1983 and interacted with election FE)
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Figure 10: Marginal effect of NPP-Proximity on voting conditional on % ages
15-25 before Chernobyl
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Table 11: Effect heterogeneity of NPP-proximity depending on economic well-
being
Greens Social-
Dem.
Liberals Conser-
vatives
Others Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NPP-Proximity 0.004 −0.019 0.004 0.002 0.009 −0.001
(0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008)
Prox. × % Benefit recip. pre-Ch. −0.050 0.107 −0.158 0.336 −0.234 0.353
(0.343) (0.561) (0.338) (0.624) (0.371) (0.378)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.968 0.979 0.936 0.975 0.956 0.974
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01; Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which
is omitted from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2;
% Female; % Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients
of social benefits; % Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; %
Turnout (all as of 1983 and interacted with election FE)
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Figure 11: Marginal effect of NPP-Proximity on voting conditional on % benefit
recipients before Chernobyl
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Table 12: Effect heterogeneity of NPP-proximity depending on education
Greens Social-
Dem.
Liberals Conser-
vatives
Others Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NPP-Proximity 0.003 −0.012 0.007 −0.006 0.008∗ 0.001
(0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005)
Prox. × % Prep. school pre-Cherno. 0.001 −0.034 −0.040∗ 0.094∗ −0.021 0.027
(0.023) (0.046) (0.022) (0.052) (0.028) (0.027)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.968 0.979 0.936 0.975 0.956 0.974
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01; Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which
is omitted from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2;
% Female; % Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients
of social benefits; % Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; %
Turnout (all as of 1983 and interacted with election FE)
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Figure 12: Marginal effect of NPP-Proximity on voting conditional on % prep.
school before Chernobyl
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Without an in-depth analysis, one can only speculate about the reasons for
the patterns described in this section. It seems, however, that polarisation from
NPP-proximity after Chernobyl consists of two different effects: higher votes for the
Green party may actually be the result of increased environmental concerns which
would explain to some extent the losses of the ideologically close social-democrats.
Given the results on education and share of benefit recipients, this effect seems
to be independent of socio-economic characteristics. The treatment effect on the
CDU/CSU, in turn, was shown to originate from counties with a high levels of
education. If one also takes into account the positive impact of adolescents on
the conservative gains after Chernobyl, one can conclude that comparatively young
and educated counties near a nuclear power plants were switching their votes more
towards the conservative parties after Chernobyl. A possible explanation for this
could be fear of declining economic prosperity after a shut-down of the nuclear
facility or different level a backlash caused by the hysteria about the safety of NPPs
in Germany immediately after the Chernobyl disaster.
8 Conclusion
This paper investigated the effect of an experience with a mainly psychological im-
pact on political beliefs in a distant country. In a case study, I looked at the electoral
response to the Chernobyl disaster in West Germany and analysed how counties lo-
cated closer or farther away from the nearest nuclear power plant responded in
Bundestag elections after April 1986. The disaster can be regarded as a forma-
tive experience since nuclear energy and awareness of its dangers were not a salient
political issue at this time and only opposed by the small Green party and minor
groupings. At the political level, I find a small, significant impact of NPP-proximity
after April 1986 on Green party vote which is in line with research on the NIMBY
effect. The results, however, also indicate a general and long-lasting polarising effect
and highlight that the party benefiting the most from proximity were in fact the
conservatives. Since they were the only pro-nuclear party after Chernobyl, this vote
can be interpreted as a signal of support for nuclear energy.
In terms of mechanisms, I demonstrate that the role of Chernobyl as an expe-
rience only materialises in the gains of the conservative CDU/CSU who are par-
ticularly benefiting from proximity in areas with a larger share of 15-25 year olds.
Further analysis reveals that counties with high educational attainment counties
exhibit a similar pattern. The results are similar to findings on the the 1976 Califor-
nia primary elections in which particularly educated citizens voted against an exit
35
from nuclear energy. Economic differences across areas do not explain the intensity
of this proximity effect. The results can be reconciled by the fact that knowledge
about an NPP’s actual danger may lower risk perception and turn citizens attention
more towards the economic consequences of abandoning nuclear energy. This is in
line with economic research on the relation between education and risk assessment
(Shaw, 1996).
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A Tables
Table 13: The effect of NPP-proximity on other parties (Standardised coeffi-
cients)
Vote share Greens Social-
Democrats
Liberals Conserva-
tives
Others
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NPP-Proximity 0.034∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.040 0.058∗∗∗ −0.011
(0.018) (0.016) (0.026) (0.019) (0.018)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.970 0.979 0.936 0.969 0.961
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01; Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which
is omitted from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2;
% Female; % Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients
of social benefits; % Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; %
Turnout 1983 (all interacted with election FE)
Table 14: Baseline results using pre-treatment controls only
Greens Social-
Dem.
Liberals Conser-
vatives
Others Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NPP-Proximity 0.003 −0.017∗∗∗ 0.001 0.008 0.005 0.005
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.968 0.979 0.936 0.975 0.956 0.974
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01; Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which
is omitted from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2;
% Female; % Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients
of social benefits; % Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; %
Turnout (all as of 1983 and interacted with election FE)
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Table 15: Baseline results and different functional forms
Green party vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NPP-Proximity 0.004∗ −0.002 −0.008 −0.024
(0.002) (0.007) (0.014) (0.032)
NPP-Proximity2 0.006 0.016 0.064
(0.006) (0.026) (0.095)
NPP-Proximity3 −0.006 −0.059
(0.013) (0.107)
NPP-Proximity4 0.020
(0.040)
County FE Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.970 0.971 0.971 0.971
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01; Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with a postChernobyl dummy, which
is omitted from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2;
% Female; % Population aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients
of social benefits; % Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest university; %
Turnout 1983 (all interacted with election FE)
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Table 16: Memory effect of NPP-proximity (detailed)
Greens Conservatives Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NPP-Proximity 0.004∗ 0.002 0.002 0.020∗∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.010 0.009∗∗∗ 0.007 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
Late election 0.010∗∗∗ 0.004 0.006∗
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004)
NPP-Proximity × Late election −0.001 0.026∗ 0.004
(0.005) (0.015) (0.007)
Months to next election 0.001∗∗ −0.002∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
NPP-Proximity × Months to next election 0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
County FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 301
Observations 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685 3,685
R2 0.970 0.972 0.971 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.978 0.978 0.979
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the precinct level in parantheses, ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Notation: all displayed coefficients are interacted with
a postChernobyl dummy, which is omitted from the table for better visualisation; Controls: Log(population); Log(population)2; % Female; % Population
aged 15–25, 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–65, ≥65 by gender; % Recipients of social benefits; % Pupils of prep school in age cohort 0–15; Proximity to closest
university; % Turnout 1983 (all interacted with election FE)
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